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Abstract. Prior research focusing on informal budget control systems is still limited, so this research is important to 
be conducted by researchers. In addition, there was a deficit problem that occurred in the West Bandung Regency 
government budget in 2019 showing an inaccurate budget estimate, so it was issued to discuss the budgetary slack. 
This study aims the effect of subordinates' truthfulness of the relationship between leader’s reputation and budgetary 
slack. This study uses a laboratory experiment method with participants being Accounting Students at Panca Bhakti 
University. A data analysis technique used two-way ANOVA with 2x2 factorial experimental design. The results 
showed that (1) the influence of leader’s reputation affected on the budgetary slack, (2) subordinates’ truthfulness 
affected on the budgetary slack, (3) subordinates’ truthfulness affected on the relationship between leader’s reputation 
and budgetary slack, (4) in favourable leader’s reputation condition, high subordinates’ truthfulness would reduce 
budgetary slack compare to low subordinates’ truthfulness, and (5) in conditions of high subordinates’ truthfulness, 
the favourable leader’s reputation would reduce budgetary slack compared to the unfavourable leader’s reputation. 
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Abstrak. Masih terbatasnya litaratur akuntansi yang berfokus terhadap sistem pengendalian anggaran yang bersifat 
informal memungkinkan penelitian ini penting untuk dilakukan oleh peneliti. Selain itu, adanya kasus defisit yang 
terjadi pada APBD pemerintah Kabupaten Bandung Barat Tahun 2019 menunjukkan estimasi anggaran tidak akurat, 
sehingga mengakibatkan terjadinya kesenjangan anggaran. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh kejujuran 
bawahan terhadap hubungan antara reputasi atasan dan kesenjangan anggaran. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode 
eskperimen laboratorium dengan partisipan adalah Mahasiswa Akuntansi Universitas Panca Bhakti. Teknik analisis 
data menggunakan Two-Way ANOVA dengan desain eksperimen 2x2 faktorial. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 
(1) reputasi atasan memengaruhi kesenjangan anggaran, (2) kejujuran bawahan memengaruhi kesenjangan anggaran, 
(3) kejujuran bawahan memengaruhi hubungan antara reputasi atasan dan kesenjangan anggaran, (4) dalam kondisi 
reputasi atasan yang favourable, kejujuran bawahan yang tinggi akan mengurangi terjadinya kesenjangan anggaran 
dibandingkan kejujuran bawahan yang rendah, dan (5) dalam kondisi kejujuran bawahan tinggi, reputasi atasan yang 
favourable akan mengurangi terjadinya kesenjangan anggaran dibandingkan reputasi atasan yang unfavourable. 
 
Kata Kunci. Kejujuran Bawahan; Kesenjangan Anggaran; Reputasi Atasan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of budgetary slack is 
one of the most researched topics in 
management accounting (Onsi, 1973; 
Merchant, 1985; Young, 1985; Dunk, 1993; 
Stevens, 2002; Web, 2002; Chong & 
Ferdiansah, 2011). However, these studies 
focus on budget control systems to reduce the 
occurrence of budgetary slack in the context of 
formal versus informal budget control systems 
(Chong & Loy, 2015). The formal budget 
control system is a mechanism that is 
structurally determined by the organization as 
part of organizational procedures that aim to 
prevent and detect the dysfunctional behavior 
of managers, whereas the informal budget 
control system is a control mechanism 
established through the culture and 
environment of the organization that affects 
the behavior of organizational members to 
work in accordance with organizational goals 
(Chong & Ferdiansah, 2011). Formal budget 
control systems such as budget control (Kren, 
1993), budget variance policies (Web, 2002), 
and preventive and detection controls (Christ 
et al., 2008). Kramer (1999) explains that 
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formal budget control systems tend to cause 
employee dissatisfaction. In addition, the 
application of formal budget control systems 
tends to have high costs (Baker, Jensen, & 
Murphy, 1988). In contrast, information 
budget control systems such as, organizational 
culture, organizational values, and trust 
between individuals in the organization (Christ 
et al., 2008). 
Chong & Loy (2015) explained that 
previous studies were still limited to testing the 
informal budget control system in reducing 
budgetary slack. Some studies that examine 
the formal budget control system in reducing 
budgetary salck such as, Douglas & Wier 
(2005) examine the culture and ethics of 
organizations in reducing budgetary slack; 
Chong & Ferdiansyah (2011) tested the trust of 
superiors and the subordinates’ truthfulness in 
reducing budgetary slack; and Chong & Loy 
(2015) show that leader's reputation negative 
effect on budgetary slack. Kren (1993) 
explains that budgetary slack are wrong 
managers' actions in interpreting their budgets 
as related to scarce resources or younger 
budgets to be achieved. In addition, Anthony 
& Govindaran (2005) explained that the 
budgetary slack is the difference between the 
budget reported and the budget in accordance 
with the best estimate for the organization. 
Budgetary slack occure when subordinates 
play down their productive abilities when 
given the opportunity to determine their work 
standards (Young, 1985).  
One form of budget slack in local 
government organizations is the case of 
deficits that occur in the West Bandung 
Regency Regional Budget in 2019 to Rp. 300 
billion. This condition occurs because the 
projected revenue in the 2019 APBD is 
increased, so that spending is adjusted to the 
revenue projection but in realities the revenue 
projection is not reached. One important 
element in the income projection that causes 
the deficit is, the income projection from the 
element of the Land and Building Tax. At the 
time of revenue projections, the projected 
revenue element of the Land and Building Tax 
was raised quite high, while in reality it was 
not achieved and had a negative impact on 
spending that had not been fulfilled because 
the money budget did not exist. This condition 
shows that the budget calculation is inaccurate 
and the budgetary slack is high. 
Researchers try to fill the limitations of 
the previous literature that tests the informal 
budget control system by testing the leader’s 
reputation and subordinates’s truthfulness in 
reducing the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
This research is a modification of the research 
of Chong & Ferdiansyah (2011) and Chong & 
Loy (2015). This research is important to do to 
provide information to stakeholders that the 
budgetary slack can not only be reduced 
through a formal but also informal budget 
control system. The leader's reputation is a 
level of attributes such as integrity, expertise, 
experience, and trust inherent in the leader. 
Leader’s who have integrity, honesty values, 
and fair values have a tendency for 
subordinates to follow the behavior of leader. 
This condition can occur because the leader's 
reputation plays an important role in providing 
implications for organizational policies. A 
good leader's reputation will make 
subordinates follow the behavior of superiors 
as effective informal controls to reduce the 
occurrence of budgetary slack created by 
subordinates. Chong & Loy's research results 
(2015) show that the leader's reputation 
negative effect on budgetary slack. 
Subordinates truthfulness is the behavior 
of subordinates who show honesty values in 
the budget preparation process through the 
accurate transfer of information between 
subordinates and leaders, so that both have the 
same information. Subordinates who have 
honesty values tend to provide relevant and 
accurate information, so that budgetary slack 
can be reduced. This condition occurs because 
subordinates are responsible for their work to 
leaders to achieve organizational goals. The 
results of Chong & Ferdiansyah's research 
(2011) showed that bandura reduce the 
occurrence of budgetary slack. 
 
Leader’s Reputation and Budgetary Slack 
Bandura (1977) explained that social 
learning theory is related to the behavior of 
leaders to be emulated by their subordinates. 
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This theory explains that individuals who lead 
organizations with a good reputation such as 
integrity and good leadership style will 
influence the behavior of subordinates, so that 
subordinates will be motivated to do the right 
thing in accordance with the norms set in the 
organization. Leader's reputation is a level of 
attributes such as expertise, experience, 
integrity, and trust inherent in the superior. 
Leaders who have this attribution become 
public figures for subordinates to act following 
the behavior of leaders. This condition can 
occur because the leader's reputation plays an 
important role in providing implications for 
organizational policies. A leader who has a 
good reputation which is realized through the 
level of attributes above, will make 
subordinates follow the leader's behavior as an 
effective informal control to reduce the 
occurrence of budgetary slack created by 
subordinates. 
Anthony & Govindarajan (2005) 
explained that the budgetary slack is the 
difference between the reported budget and the 
budget that matches the best estimate for the 
organization. Subordinates involved in 
preparing the budget tend to try to make the 
budget lower than the best estimate with the 
aim of achieving its performance more easily, 
so it does not require hard work in achieving 
the budget. On the other hand, subordinates 
involved in preparing the budget also tend to 
increase the budget from the best estimate with 
the aim of obtaining appreciation from leaders 
for showing achievement of budget targets that 
relatively require hard work. Young (1985) 
explains that budgetary slack occure when 
subordinates downplay their productive 
abilities when given the opportunity to 
determine their work standards. To reduce the 
occurrence of budgetary slack, an informal 
budget control system is needed, such as the 
leader’s reputation because this system does 
not require costs compared to formal budget 
control systems with relatively higher costs. 
Chong & Loy's research results (2015) show 
that the leader's reputation negative effect on 
budgetary slack. Based on the description, the 
hypothesis proposed is as follows. 
H1: The leader's reputation affects on the 
budgetary slack. 
 
Subordinates’ Truthfulness and Budgetary 
Slack 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) explained that 
the essence of a conflict of interest is due to the 
information asymmetry in the organization. 
Information asymmetry can occur between 
subordinates and leaders in the organization. 
This means that subordinates involved in 
preparing the budget when distributing 
information dishonestly to leaders, the 
tendency of the information to be inaccurate. 
Conversely, when subordinates involved in 
preparing the budget share information 
honestly with leaders, the tendency of the 
information becomes more accurate. The 
implication of the transfer of information 
between subordinates involved in preparing 
the budget to leaderrs shows that superiors 
have the same information as subordinates, so 
the budgetary slack is lower (Fisher et al., 
2002; Chow et al., 1988). This condition shows 
that leaders can easily detect budgetary slack 
that occur when budget submission.  
Subordinates’ truthfulness is the behavior 
of subordinates who show honesty values in 
the budget preparation process through the 
accurate transfer of information between 
subordinates and leaders, so that both have the 
same information. Subordinates who have 
honesty values tend to provide relevant and 
accurate information, so that budgetary slack 
can be reduced. This condition occurs because 
subordinates are responsible for their work to 
superiors to achieve organizational goals. The 
results of Chong & Ferdiansyah's research 
(2011) show that subordinates’ truthfulness 
can reduce the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
Based on the description, the purpose of this 
study is to examine and analyze the effect of 
subordinate honesty on the relationship 
between leaders' reputation and budgetary 
slack. Based on the description, the research 
hypothesis is as follows. 
H2: Subordinates’ truthfulness affects on 
budgetary slack. 
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Leader’s Reputation, Truthfulness of 
Subordinate, and Busgetary Slack 
The theory of social learning explained 
by Bandura (1977) shows that the behavior 
exhibited by a leader will influence the 
behavior of his subordinates. When a leader 
has a good reputation in an organization such 
as integrity, high level of education, experts in 
their field, and good leadership style will 
influence the behavior of subordinates to act in 
accordance with the leader's actions in the 
context of doing the right thing in accordance 
with the norms set in the organization. A good 
leader's reputation will become a public figure 
for subordinates to act according to the leader's 
actions. This condition can occur because the 
important role of the leader's reputation in 
increasing the achievement of organizational 
goals will affect organizational policy.  
A leader who has a good reputation 
which is realized through the level of attributes 
above, will make subordinates follow the 
leader's behavior as an effective informal 
control to reduce the occurrence of budgetary 
slack created by subordinates. When leaders 
have a good reputation and are proven through 
behavior in accordance with the norms in the 
organization, subordinates will trust leaders 
and follow leaders' behavior and are honest in 
providing accurate information. This condition 
shows that relations between subordinates and 
leaderss will be better and encourage 
subordinates to communicate and share 
information honestly with leaders, so that the 
information asymmetry is reduced. 
Subordinates involved in budget participation 
when motivated to follow the behavior of 
superiors who have integrity and good 
leadership style will reduce the budgetary 
slack when supported by subordinates' trust in 
superiors. The results of Chong & Loy's 
research (2015) show that leaders' reputation 
reduces the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
Furthermore, the results of Chong & 
Ferdiansyah's research (2011) show that 
subordinates’ truthfulness reduces budgetary 
slack.  
H3: Subordinates’ truthfulness affects on the 
relationship between leader's reputation 
and budgetary slack 
Leader’s Reputation (Favourable), 
Truthfulness of Subordinate, and 
Budgetary Slack 
The essence of conflicts of interest that 
occur in an organization is the asymmetry of 
information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
information asymmetry can occur between 
subordinates and leaders in the organization 
with the aim of fulfilling their respective 
interests. As a result, the tendency of 
subordinates involved in preparing the budget 
to not provide honest information to leaders, 
resulting in budgetary slack. Conversely, if 
subordinates involved in budgeting provide 
honest information to leaders, leaders can 
easily detect budgetary slack. This condition 
shows that when transferring accurate 
information from subordinates to leaders will 
reduce the occurrence of budgetary slack 
(Fisher et al., 2002; Chow et al., 1988). 
Bandura (1977) explains that social 
learning theory can be used to find out the 
behavior of leaders who can influence the 
behavior of subordinates. Leader’s who have 
good behavior shown through integrity and 
good leadership style will influence the 
behavior of subordinates to act in accordance 
with the actions of their leaders in accordance 
with the norms in the organization. This action 
shows that the employer has a good reputation 
for subordinates. A good leader's reputation 
will be a public figure for subordinates to act 
in accordance with the actions of leaders. This 
condition can occur because the important role 
of the superior's reputation in increasing the 
achievement of organizational goals will affect 
organizational policy. 
Subordinates who are involved in 
budgeting have a high level of honesty towards 
their leaders, they tend to reduce budgetary 
slack when supported by a favorable employer 
reputation, such as higher education, skill, and 
older age, and good leadership style. Chong & 
Ferdiansyah's research (2011) show that 
subordinates’ truthfulness reduces budgetary 
slack. Based on these descriptions, the 
researchers propose the following hypothesis. 
H4: In a favourable leader’s reputation 
condition, high subordinates’ truhtfulness 
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will reduce budgetary slack compared to 
low subordinates’ truthfulness. 
 
Leader’s Reputation, Subordinates’ 
Truthfulness (High), and Budgetary Slack 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) explained that 
information asymmetry is the essence of 
conflicts of interest in organizations. 
Information asymmetry is an important reason 
individual want to fulfill their interests. In 
public sector organizations, the tendency of 
subordinates involved in preparing the budget 
to not provide honest information to superiors 
will result in budgetary slack. This condition 
occurs because subordinates want to fulfill 
their interests through performance targets that 
are more easily achieved. Conversely, when 
subordinates involved in budgeting provide 
honest information to superiors, the budgetary 
slack is reduced. This condition indicates that 
communication between subordinates and 
leaders is more accurate, so that leaders are 
easier to detect budgetary slack (Fisher et al., 
2002; Chow et al., 1988). 
Social learning theory can be used to 
determine the behavior of leaders who can 
influence the behavior of subordinates 
(Bandura, 1977). Leaders who have good 
behavior show that the leader's reputation is 
good because they have integrity, 
transparency, and good leadership style, so that 
it will influence the behavior of subordinates 
to act in accordance with the actions of their 
leaders. This action shows that the employer 
has a good reputation for subordinates. A good 
leader's reputation shows subordinates to 
follow the behavior of leaders because leaders 
are public figures for subordinates to act in 
accordance with the actions of leaders.  
Leaders who have integrity, 
transparency, and good leadership style tend to 
motivate subordinates to reduce budgetary 
slack with superiors who lack integrity, 
transparency, and leadership style that is not 
good. This condition will be supported by the 
high level of honesty possessed by 
subordinates. That is, when the conditions of 
honesty of subordinates are high, the favorable 
reputation of the superior will reduce the 
budgetary slack compared to the reputation of 
the boss who is unfavorable. Chong & 
Ferdiansyah's research (2011) show that 
subordinates’ truthfulness can reduce 
budgetary slack. Based on the description, the 
research hypothesis is as follows. 
H5: In conditions of high subordinates’ 
truhtfulness, the favorable reputation of 
the leaders will reduce the budgetary slack 
compared to the reputation of the leaders 
who is unfavorable. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Method and Research Design 
The method that will be used in this 
research is experiment. The experimental 
method is useful for testing the effect of certain 
manipulations on other conditions under 
controlled conditions (Sukardi, 2003). 
Characteristics of experimental research that 
are deliberately applied to test the effect of the 
treatment carried out on the independent 
variable and the results seen in the dependent 
variable that has been manipulated. To see how 
the results of the independent variables were 
manipulated the researchers conducted 
experiments by comparing the four groups that 
had been manipulated.  
This research uses factorial experimental 
design. The research design used in this study 
is 2x2 which means that this experiment uses 
two levels of leader's reputation conditions 
namely, favourable and unfavourable 
conditions, and subordinates’ truthfulness 
namely, low and high conditions. Factorial 
design is used to examine the effect of leader’s 
reputation and subordinates’ truthfulness on 
budgetary slack. Researchers conducted this 
research through laboratory experiments. 
Nahartyo (2012) explains that laboratory 
experiments are arranged in an artificial 
environment where control and manipulation 
are given to prove the causal relationship 
between the variables studied. This mock 
experimental environment is an accounting 
student at Panca Bhakti University who is 
manipulated by researchers through their role 
as subordinates participating in budgeting. 
Selection of research subjects that play a 
role in this experiment is done by researchers 
through manipulation checks, so that only 
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subjects who pass the manipulation checks will 
be used by researchers to test the research 
hypothesis. The researchers uses the subject of 
students in laboratory experiment research 
compared to subordinates who participate in 
budgeting is to eliminate biases such as, 
psychological pressure due to the 
organizational environment and position in the 
organizational structure that has a tendency to 
not respond to the actual conditions because it 
is related to ethics, personality, and honesty 
subordinates, thereby reducing the social 
propriety bias that occurs when the subject 
distorts the answers to conform to social norms 
(Newman, 2003). 
The 2x2 factorial ANOVA two-way 
experimental design to test the influence of 
leader's reputation and subordinates’ 
truthfulness on budgetary slack. Chong & Loy 
(2015) examined the effect of leader' 
reputation on budgetary slack; and Chong & 
Ferdiansah (2011) examined the effect of trust 
towards leaders and subordinates’ truhtfulness 
on budgetary slack. The researchers adapted 
and modified the two studies to compile the 
experimental module in the context of this 
research. To improve the quality of this 
research module, the researchers held 
discussions with several accounting lecturers.  
The researchers observes the tendency of 
high or low budgetary slack that is done by 
subordinates by dividing the subject into 
several groups: Group 1: the favourable 
leader’s reputation with low conditions of 
subordinates’ truthfulness; Group 2: the 
favourable leader’s reputation with high 
conditions of subordinates’ truthfulness; 
Group 3; the unfavourable leader’s reputation 
with low conditions of subordinates’ 
truthfulness; Group 4: the unfavourable 
leader’s reputation with high conditions of 
subordinates’ truthfulness. The design of the 














Favourable Group 1 Group 2 
Unfavourable Group 3 Group 4 
 
The subjects of this study were 60 with 
15 subjects for each treatment carried out. 
Sekaran (2006) has provided guidelines for 
determining the number of simple 
experimental samples with strict control that is 
the size of the sample of the target subject 
studied with a sample size ranging from 10-20. 
State manipulation has been designed with a 
series of procedures that will be carried out by 
the subject so that the experiment can run 
accordingly.  
 
Operational Definitions and Variable 
Measurements 
The independent and dependent 
variables are used by researchers to explain 
social phenomena that occur in the budgeting 
process. The independent variables of this 
study are the leader's reputation (favorable and 
unfavorable), and subordinates’ truthfulness 
(low and high). Meanwhile, the dependent 
variable is the budgetary slack.  
Chong & Loy (2015) explained that the 
leader's reputation is a general attribute that 
reflects the reputation of a favorable or 
unfavorable leader based on the background 
and characteristics of the leader known by 
subordinates. Measurement of leader's 
reputation uses two conditions namely, 
favorable and unfavorable. The following is a 
brief explanation regarding the level of 
reputation of a favorite and unfavorable leader. 
Favorable level of leader’s reputation 
occurs when your boss has a minimum level of 
magister education background, has expertise 
as evidenced by certification, has relatively 
longer work experience in government 
organizations, and a relatively older age. 
Unfavorable leader's reputation level occurs 
when your boss has the highest level of 
education background of the bachelor, does 
not have the expertise as evidenced by not 
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having a certification degree, the boss's work 
experience is relatively not too long, and the 
age of leaders is relatively easier. 
Subordinates’ truthfulness in the budget 
preparation process show the values of honesty 
through the existence of an accurate transfer of 
information between subordinates and leaders, 
so that both have the same information. 
Subordinates who have honesty values tend to 
provide relevant and accurate information, so 
that budgetary slack can be reduced. The 
measurement of subordinates’ truthfulness 
uses two conditions namely, low and high. The 
following is a brief explanation related to the 
conditions of truhtfulness of low and high 
subordinates. 
Low truthfulness conditions occur when 
subordinates do not provide full information to 
leaders in the budget preparation process. 
Conditions of high truhtfulness of subordinates 
occur when subordinates provide overall 
information to superiors in the budget 
preparation process. 
Budgetary slack is the difference 
between the budget reported and the budget in 
accordance with the best estimate for the 
organization (Anthony & Govindarajan, 
2005). To measure the budgetary slack, 
participants are given scenarios or cases of 
goods/services procurement in district X. 
Participants' decision forms as subordinates 
involved in preparing the goods/services 
procurement budget to make budgetary slack 
are known through the gap between the best 
budget estimate and the budget submitted by 
subordinates. The best estimate of the budget 
in this experimental scenario is Rp.50 (million 
rupiah) and participants are asked to submit a 
budget in a range of two points, namely the 
budget submission point with a range of 1-49 
(million rupiah) and 51-100 (million rupiah) 
with due regard to reputation budget (favorable 
versus unfavorable) and subordinates’ 
truthfulness (low versus high). Participants 
who chose a budget proposal in the range of 1-
49 (million rupiah) showed a budget 
submission that was too low compared to the 
best estimate. This condition shows the 
potential for a surplus due to inaccurate budget 
submission. Conversely, participants who 
chose a budget proposal in the range of 51-100 
(million rupiah) showed a budget submission 
that was too high compared to the best 
estimate. This condition causes the potential 
for a budget deficit as happened in the West 
Bandung Regency APBD. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
The researchers conduct a series of 
experimental procedures, namely (1) the 
distribution of the experimental module to the 
participants and is not permitted to open the 
experimental module before it is instructed by 
the researchers. There are four experimental 
modules according to the treatment conditions. 
The four experimental modules are divided 
into four groups: Group 1: the favourable 
leader’s reputation with low conditions of 
subordinates’ truthfulness; Group 2: the 
favourable leader’s reputation with high 
conditions of subordinates’ truthfulness; 
Group 3; the unfavourable leader’s reputation 
with low conditions of subordinates’ 
truthfulness; Group 4: the unfavourable 
leader’s reputation with high conditions of 
subordinates’ truthfulness; (2) the researchers 
gives a brief instruction about the participant's 
task in the experiment, and (3) the end of the 
assignment, the participant is asked to place 
the experiment module as instructed by the 




The experimental participants of this 
research were undergraduate accounting 
students at Panca Bhakti University. The use 
of students as experimental participants 
because it is a third person as explained by 
Liyanarachi & Newdick (2009) and Newman 
(2003) for ethics research. The aim is to reduce 
participant response bias when participants are 
faced with a variety of sensitive ethical issues 
or reduce social propriety bias that occurs 
when participants distort answers to conform 
to social norms. Important reasons researchers 
chose the subject are, (1) Accounting students 
have been equipped with a comprehensive 
understanding of various ethical and budgeting 
issues, so that they represent research issues; 
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and (2) the topic under study relates to issues 
of ethics, personality and sensitive beliefs if 
done directly to subordinates involved in 
budgeting.  
 
Data Analysis Technique 
The research hypothesis will be tested by 
researchers using two-way analysis of 
variances (ANOVA). Before the researchers 
tests the hypothesis, the researchers test 
several assumptions namely, (1) normality 
assumptions, and (2) homogeneity 
assumptions. The normality assumption test is 
carried out through the Kolmogorov Smirnov 
one-sample test with the provisions that is, if 
sig. > 0.05, then the residuals are normally 
distributed. Meanwhile, the homogeneity 
assumption test uses the levene's test with the 
provisions that is, if sig. > 0.05, then the 
homogeneous residual. Furthermore, 
researchers conducted a randomization test 
and hypothesis testing when both assumptions 
have been met. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Two questions related to manipulation 
checks were used by researchers for the whole 
scenario given to participants. Furthermore, 
the results of participant responses to the two 
manipulation check questions are used by 
researchers in order to determine the final 
participant whose data will be used in 
hypothesis testing. Table 4 below is the result 
of manipulation check. 
 
Table 2. Manipulation Check Results 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Participant Failed to 
Answer the Questions 
Final Participant 
Group 1 15 2 13 
Group 2 15 3 12 
Group 3 15 2 13 
Group 4 15 3 12 
Table 2 shows that participants were 
divided by researchers into four groups. Each 
group was given different treatment by 
researchers with a total of 60 groups in total. 
Each group consists of 15 participants. 
Furthermore, there were 13 group 1 
participants who passed the manipulation 
check. Meanwhile, 2 participants in group 1 
did not pass the manipulation check. Group 2 
participants who passed the manipulation 
check were 12 participants. Meanwhile, 3 
participants in group 2 did not pass the 
manipulation check. Group 3 participants who 
passed the manipulation check were 13 
participants. Meanwhile, 2 participants in 
group 3 did not pass the manipulation check. 
Group 4 participants who passed the 
manipulation check were 12 participants. 
Meanwhile, 3 participants in group 4 did not 
pass the manipulation check.  
The following is table 5 showing the 
descriptive statistics of the subjects used in this 
study. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Participant 






Group 1 Male 2 15%  
 
 
Male = 15 (30%) 
Female = 35 (70%) 
Female 11 85% 
Group 2 Male 3 25% 
Female 9 75% 
Group 3 Male 7 54% 
Female 6 46% 
Group 4 Male 3 25% 
Female 9 75% 
 
 
Group 1 18-20 11 85%  
 21-24 2 15% 
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Group 2 18-20 5 42%  
18-20 tahun = 23 (46%) 
21-24 tahun = 27 (54%) 
21-24 7 58% 
Group 3 18-20 3 23% 
21-24 10 77% 
Group 4 18-20 4 33% 
21-24 8 67% 
 
Table 3 shows that for gender, female 
participants were more numerous in this 
experiment (70%) than male participants 
(30%), and for age participants who ranged 
between 21-24 years were more (54%) than 
participants' age with a range between 18-20 
years (46%). Next, the researchers conducted a 
randomization test with the aim to find out the 
distribution of each participant was evenly 
distributed for each group. Based on the results 
of the randomization test, the researchers 
concluded that the sex of the participants had a 
test value of F = 0.223, sig. 0.639; and age have 
a test value of F = 0.338, sig. 0.564. Thus, there 
were no significant differences between the 
male and female treatment groups, and the 
treatment groups ages 18-20 and ages 21-24. 
Thus, participants have been distributed evenly 
and there are no confounding variables in this 
research model.  
ANOVA testing requires test 
assumptions that must be met, namely the 
assumption of normality and homogeneity. 
The following is table 4 showing the results of 
testing normality assumptions using the 
Kolmogorov Smirnov one-sample. 
 
Table 4. Normality Test Results 




Table 4 shows that the results of testing 
Kolmogorov Smirnov one-sample normality 
assumption with sig values. 0.353> 0.05. The 
results of this test prove that the research 
model has a normally distributed residual, so 
that the research model has fulfilled the 
normality assumption test. Next, the 
researchers tests the assumption of 
homogeneity through the Leven's test. The 
following is table 5 of the homogeneity 
assumption test results. 
 
 
Table 5. Homogenity Variance Test Result 
Information Levene’s Test 
Result 0.966 
 
Table 5 shows that the results of testing 
the homogeneity assumption through the 
Leven's test show the value of sig. 0.966> 0.05. 
The results of this test prove that the research 
model has a homogeneous variant of residuals, 
so this research model has fulfilled the 
assumption of homogeneity. 
Researchers conducted a 2x2 factorial 
ANOVA test and descriptive decision 
response statistical tests to test the research 
hypothesis. The following is table 6 showing 
the results of the 2x2 factorial ANOVA test. 
The first hypothesis testing (H1) that is, 
the leader’s reputation affects on the budgetary 
slack. Based on table 6, the test results show 
that the leader's reputation has a value of F = 
11,188, and sig. 0.002 at a significance level of 
1%. The findings of this study indicate that the 
leader's reputation affects on the budgetary 
slack. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is 
supported. 
The theory of social learning is related to 
the behavior of leaders who will be emulated 
by their subordinates (Bandura, 1977). This 
theory explains that leaders or leaders who lead 
organizations with good reputation such as 
integrity, transparency, and good leadership 
style will influence the behavior of 
subordinates to act in accordance with the 
actions of leaders, so that subordinates will be 
motivated to do the right thing in accordance 
with the norms that have been set in the 
organization. Leaders are said to have a 
reputation when superiors have integrity, 
expertise, experience, and trust inherent in 
leaders. The positive implications of the 
leader's reputation that benefit this 
organization shows that the leader is a public 
figure for subordinates to act in accordance 
with the leader's behavior. This condition can 
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occur because the leader's reputation plays an 
important role in providing implications for 
organizational policies. leaders who have a 
favorable reputation will make subordinates 
follow the behavior of leaders as effective 
informal controls to reduce the budgetary slack 
created by subordinates. 
The second hypothesis testing (H2) 
namely, subordinates’ truthfulness affects on 
the budgetary slack. Based on table 6, the test 
results show that the subordinates’ truhtfulness 
has a value of F = 5.522, and sig. 0.023 at a 
significance level of 5%. The findings of this 
study indicate that subordinates’ truhtfulness 
affects on the budgetary slack. Therefore, the 







Table 6. Factorial 2x2 ANOVA Test Results 
Source Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 603.168 6.826 0.001*** 
Intercept 1 20642.400 233.597 0.000*** 
Leader’s Reputation 1 988.683 11.188 0.002*** 
Truthfulness of Subordinates 1 488.000 5.522          0.023** 
Leader’s Reputation X Truthfulness of 
Subordinate 
1 379.723 4.297          0.044** 
Error 46 88.368   
Total 50    
Corrected Total 49    
R2 = 0.308 
Adjusted R2 = 0.263 
Notes: *** significance at level 1%; ** significance at level 5% 
Subordinates’ truhtfulness is the 
behavior of subordinates who show honesty 
values in the budget preparation process 
through the accurate transfer of information 
between subordinates and leaders, so that both 
have the same information. The implication of 
the transfer of information between 
subordinates involved in preparing the budget 
to leaders shows that leaders have the same 
information as subordinates, so the budgetary 
slack is lower (Fisher et al., 2002; Chow et al., 
1988). This condition shows that leaders can 
easily detect budgetary slack that occur when 
budget submission. Subordinates who have 
honesty values tend to provide relevant and 
accurate information, so that budgetary slack 
can be reduced. This condition occurs because 
subordinates are responsible for their work to 
leaders to achieve organizational goals.  
The third hypothesis testing (H3) namely, 
subordinates’ truthfulness affects the 
relationship between leader’s reputation and 
budgetary slack. Based on table 6, the test 
results show that the interaction between the 
leader’s reputation and subordinates; 
truthfulness has a value of F = 4,297, and sig. 
0.044 at the 5% significance level. The 
findings of this study indicate that 
subordinates’ truthfulness influences the 
relationship between leader’s reputation and 
budgetary slack. Therefore, the supported 
hypothesis (H3) is supported. 
Leaders who have a good reputation are 
manifested through the level of attributes of 
expertise, experience, integrity, honesty, 
fairness, and trust inherent in superiors will 
make subordinates follow the behavior of 
leaders as effective informal controls to reduce 
the occurrence of budgetary slack created by 
subordinates. When leaders have a good 
reputation and are proven through behavior in 
accordance with the norms in the organization, 
subordinates will trust leaders and follow 
leaders' behavior and are honest in providing 
accurate information. This condition shows 
that relations between subordinates and leaders 
will be better and encourage subordinates to 
communicate and share information honestly 
with leaders, so that the information 
asymmetry is reduced. Subordinates involved 
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in budget participation when motivated to 
follow the behavior of leaders who have 
integrity and good leadership style will reduce 
the budgetary slack when supported by 
subordinates' trust in superiors. 
To test hypotheses 4 and 5, researchers 
used a descriptive test of the decision response 
statistics and the One-Way Anova test. Table 7 
shows the results of the descriptive statistical 
testing of participant decision responses and 
table 8 shows the results of the One Way 
Anova test. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Decision Response 
Leader’s Reputation Subordinates’ Truthfulness Total 
Low High 































The fourth hypothesis testing (H4) 
namely, in a favorable leader’s reputation 
condition, high subordinates’ truthfulness will 
reduce the budgetary slack compared to low 
subordinates’ truthfulness. Based on table 6, 
the test results show that the leader's reputation 
has a value of F = 11,188, and sig. 0.002 at a 
significance level of 1%. Furthermore, 
subordinates’ truthfulness has a value of F = 
5,522, and sig. 0.023 at a significance level of 
5%. To test the fourth hypothesis (H4), the 
researchers compared groups 1 and 2. The 
results of the comparison of these two groups 
showed that the mean difference was 11.77, 
and sig. 0.007 at a significance level of 1%. 
The mean value of favorable leader’s 
reputation in conditions of high subordinate 
truthfulness related to budgetary slack is lower 
than the mean value of favorable leader’s 
reputation in conditions of low subordinates’ 
truthfulness. The findings of this study prove 
that the favorable leader’s reputation in 
conditions of high subordinates’ truthfulness 
will reduce the budgetary slack compared to 
conditions of low subordinates’ truthfulness. 
Thus, the fourth hypothesis (H4) is supported. 
Favorable leader’s reputation will be a 
public figure for subordinates to act in 
accordance with the actions of leaders. This 
condition can occur because the important role 
of the leader's reputation in increasing the 
achievement of organizational goals will affect 
organizational policy. Subordinates involved 
in budgeting have a high level of honesty 
towards their leaders, they tend to reduce 
budgetary slack when supported by a favorable 
leader’s reputation, such as higher education 
level, expertise, and older age, and good 
leadership style. 
The fifth hypothesis testing (H5) is that, 
in conditions of high subordinates’ 
truthfulness, the favorable reputation of the 
leader will reduce the budgetary slack 
compared to the reputation of the leader who is 
unfavorable. Based on table 6, the test results 
show that the leader's reputation has a value of 
F = 11,188, and sig. 0.002 at a significance 
level of 1%. Furthermore, subordinates’ 
truthfulness has a value of F = 5,522, and sig. 
0.023 at a significance level of 5%. To test the 
fourth hypothesis (H5), the researchers 
compared groups 2 and 4. The results of the 
comparison of these two groups showed that 
the mean difference was 14.42, and sig. 0.001 
at a significance level of 1%. The mean value 
of favorable leader’s reputation in conditions 
of high subordinates’ truthfulness related to 
budgetary slack is lower than the mean value 
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of reputation of leader’s who are unfavorable 
in conditions of high subordinates’ 
truthfulness. The findings of this study prove 
that under conditions of high subordinates’ 
truthfulness, the favorable reputation of 
leaders will reduce the budgetary slack 
compared to the reputation of leaders who are 
unfavorable. Thus, the fifth hypothesis (H5) is 
supported. 
In public sector organizations, the 
tendency of subordinates involved in preparing 
the budget to not provide honest information to 
leaders will result in budgetary slack. This 
condition occurs because subordinates want to 
fulfill their interests through performance 
targets that are more easily achieved. 
Conversely, when subordinates involved in 
budgeting provide honest information to 
leaders, the budgetary slack is reduced. This 
condition indicates that communication 
between subordinates and leaders is more 
accurate, so that leaders are easier to detect 
budgetary slack (Fisher et al., 2002; Chow et 
al., 1988). Leader who have integrity, 
transparency, and good leadership style tend to 
motivate subordinates to reduce budgetary 
slack with leader who lack integrity, 
transparency, and leadership style that is not 
good. This condition will be supported by the 
high level of honesty possessed by 
subordinates. That is, when the conditions of 
subordinates’ truthfulness are high, the 
favorable reputation of the leader will reduce 
the budgetary slack compared to the reputation 
of the leader who is unfavorable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The results of this study proves that (1) 
the influence of leader’s reputation affected on 
the budgetary slack, (2) subordinates’ 
truthfulness affected on the budgetary slack, 
(3) subordinates’ truthfulness affected on the 
relationship between leader’s reputation and 
budgetary slack, (4) in favourable leader’s 
reputation condition, high subordinates’ 
truthfulness would reduce budgetary slack 
compare to low subordinates’ truthfulness, and 
(5) in conditions of high subordinates’ 
truthfulness, the favourable leader’s reputation 
would reduce budgetary slack compared to the 
unfavourable leader’s reputation. Based on the 
description of the research findings, this 
research can provide several contributions 
such as theoretical and policy contributions. 
The contribution of this research to the 
development of theory is, (1) Favorable 
leader’s reputation can reduce budgetary slack 
in the organization. The leader's reputation 
shows that the leader has a high level of 
education, expertise, experience, integrity, 
honesty, fairness, and trust inherent in the 
leader. The positive implication of a leader’s 
favorable reputation in the organization is that 
the leader’s will be made a public figure by 
subordinates, so that subordinates will be 
motivated to do the right thing in accordance 
with the norms set in the organization as a 
reflection of the leader's behavior. Therefore, 
this research is able to provide confirmation of 
social learning theory, (2) budgetary slack 
caused by the information asymmetry between 
subordinates and leaders in preparing the 
budget. This means that subordinates involved 
in preparing the budget when distributing 
information dishonestly to leaders, the 
tendency of the information to be inaccurate. 
Conversely, when subordinates involved in 
preparing the budget share information 
honestly with leaders, the tendency of the 
information becomes more accurate. The 
implication of the transfer of information 
between subordinates involved in preparing 
the budget to leaders shows that superiors have 
the same information as subordinates, so the 
budgetary slack is lower. Thus, this research is 
able to contribute to agency theory. 
The contribution of this research to 
policy is that regulators need to design 
informal control systems in reducing the 
occurrence of budgetary slack in accordance 
with the specific goals of the organization by 
considering an important aspect of the leader's 
reputation. Leader’s reputation that is 
favorable in public sector organizations such 
as, a high level of education, expertise, 
experience, integrity, honesty, fairness, and 
trust inherent in superiors. The application of a 
leader's reputation as an important part of the 
budget control system contributes to the 
organization because it reduces costs 
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compared to the adoption of a formal budget 
control system.  
The limitations of this study are, (1) this 
study only uses accounting students at Panca 
Bhakti University who are undergraduate as 
participants. This is because the researchers 
takes into account the adequacy of participants 
in each group, and (2) the researchers only 
examines in terms of an informal budget 
control system due to the limitations of the 
previous literature by referring to the 
phenomenon or case of budget deficits that 
occurred in the West Bandung Regency 
government in 2019 without taking into 
account the factors other. Thus, further 
research is expected (1) to expand experiment 
research participants such as bachelor students 
by taking into account the adequacy of 
participants in the experiment, and (2) 
researchers can use other factors that can affect 
budgetary slack by using deficit cases that 
occur in public sector organizations. 
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